TNAG-1392-FCO40-1864-Future-of-Hong-Kong-briefing-for-meetings-and-visits-1985 — Page 229

CONFIDENTIAL

be possible at all without Vietnamese cooperation, and that it would not be possible in either political or humanitarian terms without

treatment of those concerned.

satisfactory assurances

the course

as to the

The se are unlikely to be forthcoming. The other arguments against essentially stem from these two points. The only way to make sure that we are drawing the right conclusions, and more important to convince the Executive Council in Hong Kong that they are the right ones, is to talk to the Vietnamese about their

attitude.

live!

ก

13.

The arguments in favour of this are:

(1)

(2)

(3)

Although we are not optimistic of the outcome, we cannot say with absolute certainty what the Vietnamese attitude

will be or how it will evolve. We should therefore try to initiate a dialogue with them, even if it may be years before it produces any fruit (if it

fruit (if it ever does).

There

is very strong pressure from the Hong Kong

Government, supported by the Executive Council (and

undoubtedly by local popular opinion) to explore the possibility of involuntary repatriation. Even though the

probability

is

that the course will turn out to be

impracticable we owe it to Hong Kong to explore seriously and not to dismiss it out of hand.

it

this

I f our approach to the Vietnamese is unsuccessful,

fact alone will enable

us to put greater pressure on other

countries to do more for Hong Kong in resettlement terms.

14. The arguments against are:

wims

Cat UNHCR -Thnow hadn

low car

V

(1)

✓

(2)

All the evidence is that the Vietnamese response will be negative. They might seek to embarrass us by publicising

the approach.

There is a danger that even discussing the possibility

of

involuntary repatriation with the

damage our relations with the UNHCR.

will sen?

Vietnamese

will