CONFIDENTIAL
be possible at all without Vietnamese cooperation, and that it would not be possible in either political or humanitarian terms without
treatment of those concerned.
satisfactory assurances
the course
as to the
The se are unlikely to be forthcoming. The other arguments against essentially stem from these two points. The only way to make sure that we are drawing the right conclusions, and more important to convince the Executive Council in Hong Kong that they are the right ones, is to talk to the Vietnamese about their
attitude.
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13.
The arguments in favour of this are:
(1)
(2)
(3)
Although we are not optimistic of the outcome, we cannot say with absolute certainty what the Vietnamese attitude
will be or how it will evolve. We should therefore try to initiate a dialogue with them, even if it may be years before it produces any fruit (if it
fruit (if it ever does).
There
is very strong pressure from the Hong Kong
Government, supported by the Executive Council (and
undoubtedly by local popular opinion) to explore the possibility of involuntary repatriation. Even though the
probability
is
that the course will turn out to be
impracticable we owe it to Hong Kong to explore seriously and not to dismiss it out of hand.
it
this
I f our approach to the Vietnamese is unsuccessful,
fact alone will enable
us to put greater pressure on other
countries to do more for Hong Kong in resettlement terms.
14. The arguments against are:
wims
Cat UNHCR -Thnow hadn
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V
(1)
✓
(2)
All the evidence is that the Vietnamese response will be negative. They might seek to embarrass us by publicising
the approach.
There is a danger that even discussing the possibility
of
involuntary repatriation with the
damage our relations with the UNHCR.
will sen?
Vietnamese
will