TNAG-1392-FCO40-1864-Future-of-Hong-Kong-briefing-for-meetings-and-visits-1985 — Page 178

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be possible at all without Vietnamese cooperation, and that it would

not be possible in either political or humanitarian terms without

satisfactory assurances

treatment of those concerned.

as to the

The se are unlikely to be forthcoming. The other arguments against

the course essentially stem from these two points. The only way to

make sure that we are drawing the right conclusions, and more

important to convince the Executive Council in Hong Kong that they

are the right

is

to. talk to the Vietnamese about their

attitude.

ones,

13.

Political

explainy

1

ས་

14.

The arguments in favour of this are:

(1)

(2)

Although we are not optimistic of the outcome, we cannot

say with absolute certainty what the Vietnamese attitude

will be or how it will evolve. We should therefore try to

initiate a dialogue with them, even if it may be years

before it produces any fruit (if it ever does).

is

There

very strong pressure from the Hong Kong

Government, supported by the Executive Council (and undoubtedly by local popular opinion) to explore the

possibility of involuntary repatriation. Even though the

probability is that the cours e will turn out to be

impracticable we Owe it to Hong Kong to

it

seriously and not to dismiss it out of hand.

(3)

I f

explore

our approach to the Vietnamese i s unsuccessful, this

fact alone will enable us to put greater pressure on other

countries to do more for Hong Kong in resettlement terms.

The arguments against are:

(1)

A 11 the evidence is that the

negative. They might seek to

j

the approach.

mj

(2)

There

of

into from ~

Car will

Ari love car

+

damage our relations with the UNHCR.

will sen?

*

Vietnamese response will be

embarrass us by publicising

involuntary

is a danger that even

repatriation

discussing the possibility

with

the

Vietnamese

will

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