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be possible at all without Vietnamese cooperation, and that it would
not be possible in either political or humanitarian terms without
satisfactory assurances
treatment of those concerned.
as to the
The se are unlikely to be forthcoming. The other arguments against
the course essentially stem from these two points. The only way to
make sure that we are drawing the right conclusions, and more
important to convince the Executive Council in Hong Kong that they
are the right
is
to. talk to the Vietnamese about their
attitude.
ones,
13.
Political
explainy
1
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14.
The arguments in favour of this are:
(1)
(2)
Although we are not optimistic of the outcome, we cannot
say with absolute certainty what the Vietnamese attitude
will be or how it will evolve. We should therefore try to
initiate a dialogue with them, even if it may be years
before it produces any fruit (if it ever does).
is
There
very strong pressure from the Hong Kong
Government, supported by the Executive Council (and undoubtedly by local popular opinion) to explore the
possibility of involuntary repatriation. Even though the
probability is that the cours e will turn out to be
impracticable we Owe it to Hong Kong to
it
seriously and not to dismiss it out of hand.
(3)
I f
explore
our approach to the Vietnamese i s unsuccessful, this
fact alone will enable us to put greater pressure on other
countries to do more for Hong Kong in resettlement terms.
The arguments against are:
(1)
A 11 the evidence is that the
negative. They might seek to
j
the approach.
mj
(2)
There
of
into from ~
Car will
Ari love car
+
damage our relations with the UNHCR.
will sen?
*
Vietnamese response will be
embarrass us by publicising
involuntary
is a danger that even
repatriation
discussing the possibility
with
the
Vietnamese
will
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