TNAG-1392-FCO40-1864-Future-of-Hong-Kong-briefing-for-meetings-and-visits-1985 — Page 162

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(b) Involuntary repatriation to Vietnam

16.

The Hong Kong Government has proposed this on several occasions

since 1982.

The proposals are based on the premise that the majority of arrivals are now not true refugees, and they should

therefore be treated in the same way as persons from other countries

seeking to enter Hong Kong: new arrivals would be screened, and

those who lacked either proper documentation or convincing grounds

on which to

claim asylum would be treated as illegal immigrants and returned to Vietnam. Only those able to provide convincing grounds on which to claim asylum as refugees would be granted would be in keeping with Hong Kong's treatment of illegal immigrants from China, who have been repatriated since 1974.

it.

This

in

favour of such a Course are that it would

as a deterrent,

that even where the deterrent

by the

It

17. The arguments

certainly be effective

failed to work it could dispose of a good part of the problem posed

and that it i s justified

proportion of recent arrivals.

and would probably allow the closed

be consistent with our policy

by future refugee arrivals,

non-refugee nature of a large

would be popular in Hong Kong,

camp policy to be abandoned. I t

on illegal immigration from China.

18.

Would

to

Arguments against are that the course would be likely to be

generally unpopular with public and

public and parliamentary opinion here, and

would encounter vociferous objection from the refugee lobby. Since

Hong Kong has по land boundary with Vietnam and aircraft or ships

would need to be used, there could be

considerable physical

difficulty in carrying out repatriation, and a high profile could

not be avoided. Indeed it would be required if the policy were

be effectively. I t would be difficult to secure

with such a programme (although there are some

within UNHCR) and impossible unless the Vietnamese

given credible assurances that they would not

returned to Vietnam. Such assurances would also be essential from

the point of view of public and parliamentary opinion, and in order

to avoid breaching our obligations under the International Covenant

on Civil

Political Rights. On available evidence it will be

either Vietname se agreement to receive back

and

very difficult

the persons

to secure

concerned, or assurances as to their

UNHCR Cooperation

conflicting views

Government had

illtreat persons

treatment.

The

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