CONFIDENTIAL
(b) Involuntary repatriation to Vietnam
16.
The Hong Kong Government has proposed this on several occasions
since 1982.
The proposals are based on the premise that the majority of arrivals are now not true refugees, and they should
therefore be treated in the same way as persons from other countries
seeking to enter Hong Kong: new arrivals would be screened, and
those who lacked either proper documentation or convincing grounds
on which to
claim asylum would be treated as illegal immigrants and returned to Vietnam. Only those able to provide convincing grounds on which to claim asylum as refugees would be granted would be in keeping with Hong Kong's treatment of illegal immigrants from China, who have been repatriated since 1974.
it.
This
in
favour of such a Course are that it would
as a deterrent,
that even where the deterrent
by the
It
17. The arguments
certainly be effective
failed to work it could dispose of a good part of the problem posed
and that it i s justified
proportion of recent arrivals.
and would probably allow the closed
be consistent with our policy
by future refugee arrivals,
non-refugee nature of a large
would be popular in Hong Kong,
camp policy to be abandoned. I t
on illegal immigration from China.
18.
Would
to
Arguments against are that the course would be likely to be
generally unpopular with public and
public and parliamentary opinion here, and
would encounter vociferous objection from the refugee lobby. Since
Hong Kong has по land boundary with Vietnam and aircraft or ships
would need to be used, there could be
considerable physical
difficulty in carrying out repatriation, and a high profile could
not be avoided. Indeed it would be required if the policy were
be effectively. I t would be difficult to secure
with such a programme (although there are some
within UNHCR) and impossible unless the Vietnamese
given credible assurances that they would not
returned to Vietnam. Such assurances would also be essential from
the point of view of public and parliamentary opinion, and in order
to avoid breaching our obligations under the International Covenant
on Civil
Political Rights. On available evidence it will be
either Vietname se agreement to receive back
and
very difficult
the persons
to secure
concerned, or assurances as to their
UNHCR Cooperation
conflicting views
Government had
illtreat persons
treatment.
The
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