TNAG-1392-FCO40-1864-Future-of-Hong-Kong-briefing-for-meetings-and-visits-1985 — Page 160

perhaps

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indefinitely thereafter

is

profoundly worrying for the

following reasons:

(a)

A s the length

of stay in camps, particularly closed camps, increases and the prospects for resettlement for most refugees remain poor or worsen, despair may set in and give rise to disturbances of which we have already had a foretaste (para 7(a) above). Hunger strikes will probably give way

to riots. There are children now growing up

now growing up in the camps who will have lived their whole lives in confinement.

(b) Long term detention

for resettlement.

UNHCR

is not a suitable way to prepare refugees

and

others are concerned that refugees who spend a long time in closed centres will lose their will to regain their self-sufficiency.

(c) The local Chinese population of Hong Kong consider it unjust that Vietnamese are allowed to remain indefinitely in Hong Kong while illegal immigrants from China are repatriated. They find it difficult to accept that public money should be spent on building, equipping and running refugee centres rather than ΟΠ social services and other amenities for the local population. (The cost to the Hong Kong government of providing asylum for Vietnamese refugees in the

next financial year will be HK$ 103 million, of which HK$ 22. million will probably be reimbursed by UNHCR). There i s a general feeling that Hong Kong is being asked to shoulder more than its fair

share of the Vietnamese refugee burden.

(d) The

5

Hong Kong Government and HMG will face strong humanitarian

lobbying to end the closed centre policy, especially if there are

outbreaks of violence.

(e) Legal questions may be raised about

raised about the closed centre policy;

(£) Finally, it is possible that, if the problem continues unsolved

becomes more serious, we may face Chinese pressure to set our

or

house in order before 1997.

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