TNAG-1357-FCO40-1798-Constitutional-development-in-Hong-Kong-1985 — Page 93

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(b)

discovering what sort of government structures

Chinese have in mind for the SAR;

the

(c)

convincing the

the Chinese of the desirability of our o wn

proposals for reform when we have any.

A start has been made during Ji Pengfei's visit. We shall now

attempt to follow this up with other Chinese officials visiting

Hong Kong and perhaps NCNA.

12.

primarily; but wish it

Not exclusivey

*

Peking.

The Chinese are prepared to have such a dialogue, but

take place between the Ambassador and Zhou Nan in

This is probably because:

to

ہوا

(a)

Zhou Nan wishes to keep his hands on it.

(b)

They are still worried about three-legged stools.

(c)

They do not entirely trust NCNA in Hong Kong.

We cannot

refuse such refuse such a dialogue, but it is unlikely to be very

helpful in elucidating the way forward, given Zhou Nan's

temperament and the fact that the Ambassador, who i s not

involved in a day-to-day basis in the formulation of policy in

Hong Kong, can only act on the basis of specific instructions, which makes a living, flexible dialogue almost impossible. may however serve other purposes, including the elimination of misunderstandings when they occur.

It

UK Pressures

13.

There will also be s ome pressures here. The debates on the Agreement and the Hong Kong Bill indicated a wide degree of

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