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(b)
discovering what sort of government structures
Chinese have in mind for the SAR;
the
(c)
convincing the
the Chinese of the desirability of our o wn
proposals for reform when we have any.
A start has been made during Ji Pengfei's visit. We shall now
attempt to follow this up with other Chinese officials visiting
Hong Kong and perhaps NCNA.
12.
primarily; but wish it
Not exclusivey
*
Peking.
The Chinese are prepared to have such a dialogue, but
take place between the Ambassador and Zhou Nan in
This is probably because:
to
ہوا
(a)
Zhou Nan wishes to keep his hands on it.
(b)
They are still worried about three-legged stools.
(c)
They do not entirely trust NCNA in Hong Kong.
We cannot
refuse such refuse such a dialogue, but it is unlikely to be very
helpful in elucidating the way forward, given Zhou Nan's
temperament and the fact that the Ambassador, who i s not
involved in a day-to-day basis in the formulation of policy in
Hong Kong, can only act on the basis of specific instructions, which makes a living, flexible dialogue almost impossible. may however serve other purposes, including the elimination of misunderstandings when they occur.
It
UK Pressures
13.
There will also be s ome pressures here. The debates on the Agreement and the Hong Kong Bill indicated a wide degree of
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