TNAG-1352-FCO40-1793-Constitutional-development-in-Hong-Kong-1985 — Page 81

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GR 500

CONFIDENTIAL

DESK BY 131100Z

CONFIDENTIAL

FM HONG KONG 130935Z FEB 85

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 344 OF 13 FEBRUARY

INFO PRIORITY PEKING

ник

2. HICC ONTBY

TOP COPY

M4FEB 193

PA CL

YOUR TELNO 243: AMENDMENTS TO LETTERS PATENT-AND-ROYAL

INSTRUCTIONS AND LEGCO (ELECTORAL PROVISIONS) BILL.

1. I AM PLEASED THAT YOU WILL RECOMMEND TO MINISTERS THAT THE

GOVERNOR SHOULD NOT BE GIVEN RESERVE POWERS OF LEGISLATIONS, AND THAT ASSENT SHOULD NOT BE RESERVED ON BILLS AFFECTING THE POWERS,

PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL: AND THAT

MY VIEWS WILL BE FULLY REPRESENTED TO THEM.

2. IN ADDITION TO THE REASONS GIVEN IN MY TELNOS 285 AND 286

FOR NOT RECOMMENDING THESE PROPOSALS, IT SHOULD BE MADE CLEAR

THAT, IF MINISTERS DO DECIDE THAT THE PROPOSALS SHOULD BE

PURSUED, I SHOULD HAVE TO CONSULT EXCO ABOUT THEM, AS THEY

WOULD REPRESENT MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES WHICH HAVE NOT

BEEN CONSIDERED BY EXCO HITHERTO. IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO

DO THIS WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE PRESENT EXERCISE, IN THE VERY

LIMITED TIME AVAILABLE. ANY SUCH CHANGES WOULD THEREFORE HAVE

TO BE PURSUED SEPARATELY.

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3. AS REGARDS THE GOVERNOR'S POWERS OF DISSOLUTION, I DO NOT CONSIDER IT WOULD BE ADVISABLE TO INTRODUCE SUCH POWERS FOR THE REASONS STATED IN PARA 1(B) OF MY TELNO 287. YOUR ARGUMENT

THAT TO GIVE THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE THE POWER TO DISSOLVE THE

LIGISLATURE AT ANY TIME WOULD TEND TO STRENGTHEN DEMOCRACY SEEMS TO ME TO BE HIGHLY DEBATABLE. EVEN IF THIS POWER WERE

FIRMLY COUPLED WITH THE REQUIREMENT TO HOLD FRESH ELECTIONS

WITHIN A SPECIFIED AND REASONABLE SHORT PERIOD FROM THE

DISSOLUTION, A DETERMINED CHIEF EXECUTIVE COULD STILL USE

IT TO FRUSTRATE THE LEGISLATURE BY ORDERING REPEATED DISSOLUTIONS.

IT WOULD BE VERY DANGEROUS TO GIVE THE CHINESE AN INCENTIVE OR

EXCUSE TO INCLUDE THIS SORT OF POWER IN THE BASIC LAW. WITHOUT

THIS POWER THERE WOULD BE A STRONG INCENTIVE TO REACH AN ACCEPT- ABLE COMPROMISE THE KIND OF PROCESS WHICH IS A REGULAR OCCURRENCE

IN THE UNITED STATES.

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4. NOR DO I ACCEPT THAT A POWER OF DISSOLUTION WILL BE NECESSARY

TO PROVIDE FLEXIBILITY OVER THE DATES OF ELECTION BETWEEN NOW AND

1997. ONE OF THE MATTERS WHICH WILL HAVE TO BE ADDRESSED IN THE

1987 REVEIW IS WHETHER OR NOT WE SHOULD CHANGE THE PRESENT 3-YEAR

ELECTORAL CYCLE. IF IT DOES PROVE NECESSARY TO VARY THE YEARS IN

WHICH ELECTIONS WILL TAKE PLACE DURING THE 1990S, IN ORDER TO AVOID AN ELECTION TAKING PLACE IN 1997, THIS COULD BE DONE BY

SPECIFIC LEGISLATIVE ACT AT ANY TIME. IT DOES NOT REQUIRE A

GENERAL POWER OF DISSOLUTION TO BE INCLUDED IN THE ROYAL INSTRUCT-

IONS NOW.

CONFIDENTIAL

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