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GR 500
CONFIDENTIAL
DESK BY 131100Z
CONFIDENTIAL
FM HONG KONG 130935Z FEB 85
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 344 OF 13 FEBRUARY
INFO PRIORITY PEKING
ник
2. HICC ONTBY
TOP COPY
M4FEB 193
PA CL
YOUR TELNO 243: AMENDMENTS TO LETTERS PATENT-AND-ROYAL
INSTRUCTIONS AND LEGCO (ELECTORAL PROVISIONS) BILL.
1. I AM PLEASED THAT YOU WILL RECOMMEND TO MINISTERS THAT THE
GOVERNOR SHOULD NOT BE GIVEN RESERVE POWERS OF LEGISLATIONS, AND THAT ASSENT SHOULD NOT BE RESERVED ON BILLS AFFECTING THE POWERS,
PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL: AND THAT
MY VIEWS WILL BE FULLY REPRESENTED TO THEM.
2. IN ADDITION TO THE REASONS GIVEN IN MY TELNOS 285 AND 286
FOR NOT RECOMMENDING THESE PROPOSALS, IT SHOULD BE MADE CLEAR
THAT, IF MINISTERS DO DECIDE THAT THE PROPOSALS SHOULD BE
PURSUED, I SHOULD HAVE TO CONSULT EXCO ABOUT THEM, AS THEY
WOULD REPRESENT MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES WHICH HAVE NOT
BEEN CONSIDERED BY EXCO HITHERTO. IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO
DO THIS WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE PRESENT EXERCISE, IN THE VERY
LIMITED TIME AVAILABLE. ANY SUCH CHANGES WOULD THEREFORE HAVE
TO BE PURSUED SEPARATELY.
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3. AS REGARDS THE GOVERNOR'S POWERS OF DISSOLUTION, I DO NOT CONSIDER IT WOULD BE ADVISABLE TO INTRODUCE SUCH POWERS FOR THE REASONS STATED IN PARA 1(B) OF MY TELNO 287. YOUR ARGUMENT
THAT TO GIVE THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE THE POWER TO DISSOLVE THE
LIGISLATURE AT ANY TIME WOULD TEND TO STRENGTHEN DEMOCRACY SEEMS TO ME TO BE HIGHLY DEBATABLE. EVEN IF THIS POWER WERE
FIRMLY COUPLED WITH THE REQUIREMENT TO HOLD FRESH ELECTIONS
WITHIN A SPECIFIED AND REASONABLE SHORT PERIOD FROM THE
DISSOLUTION, A DETERMINED CHIEF EXECUTIVE COULD STILL USE
IT TO FRUSTRATE THE LEGISLATURE BY ORDERING REPEATED DISSOLUTIONS.
IT WOULD BE VERY DANGEROUS TO GIVE THE CHINESE AN INCENTIVE OR
EXCUSE TO INCLUDE THIS SORT OF POWER IN THE BASIC LAW. WITHOUT
THIS POWER THERE WOULD BE A STRONG INCENTIVE TO REACH AN ACCEPT- ABLE COMPROMISE THE KIND OF PROCESS WHICH IS A REGULAR OCCURRENCE
IN THE UNITED STATES.
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4. NOR DO I ACCEPT THAT A POWER OF DISSOLUTION WILL BE NECESSARY
TO PROVIDE FLEXIBILITY OVER THE DATES OF ELECTION BETWEEN NOW AND
1997. ONE OF THE MATTERS WHICH WILL HAVE TO BE ADDRESSED IN THE
1987 REVEIW IS WHETHER OR NOT WE SHOULD CHANGE THE PRESENT 3-YEAR
ELECTORAL CYCLE. IF IT DOES PROVE NECESSARY TO VARY THE YEARS IN
WHICH ELECTIONS WILL TAKE PLACE DURING THE 1990S, IN ORDER TO AVOID AN ELECTION TAKING PLACE IN 1997, THIS COULD BE DONE BY
SPECIFIC LEGISLATIVE ACT AT ANY TIME. IT DOES NOT REQUIRE A
GENERAL POWER OF DISSOLUTION TO BE INCLUDED IN THE ROYAL INSTRUCT-
IONS NOW.
CONFIDENTIAL
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