TNAG-1317-FCO40-1720-Future-of-Hong-Kong-meetings-of-the-Cabinet-Defence-and-Over-1984 — Page 89

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Disadvantages

(i)

The

Continuity pre and post-1997 would not be guaranteed.

Chief Minister would have to be "promoted". The Chinese

might take the opportunity to install their Own su cessor

the Governor after 1997, although they have said they will

not send people from the mainland to rule Hong Kong.

to

(ii)

The Chinese might still object that we were going too far in allowing the local people to choose senior officials.

(iii) There could be disputes between the Governor and the Chief

Minister.

10. Option (d) could be combined with an attempt to turn the probable existence of a joint Sino-British group in Hong Kong to constructive use, as described in sub-paragraph 10 (d) below.

Advantages

from an elected

(a) There would be provision for continuity from an

Governor to an elected Chief Executive.

(b) HMG would retain specific reserved powers. They would aim not to employ these except in an emergency when they might have to exercise them directly. In emergencies affecting internal or

external security this might involve sending instructions to

the Commander British Forces. In a "political" emergency (for

example in circumstances where a locally elected Governor

sought to pursue policies inconsistent with the Sino-British agreement), it might be necessary to

to HMG to remove him from

office.

(c) The Chinese might accept the arrangement of an elected Governor

in return for our acceptance of a Joint Group.

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