TNAG-1317-FCO40-1720-Future-of-Hong-Kong-meetings-of-the-Cabinet-Defence-and-Over-1984 — Page 88

SECRET

complete.

There would be a major break in continuity at that date.

Moreover, the arrangement could appear unacceptably colonialist and might not meet Hong Kong aspirations.

8. Option (b) would ensure that a complete system of local

autonomy would be established before 1997, providing a me ans of

ensuring continuity on and after that date. It would 80 some way to

meet the demands in Hong Kong for greater democracy. I f there were

no top post appointed from outside Hong Kong, it would be more

difficult for the Chinese to argue that they should put their Own

man in after 1997. But it would be difficult for HMG to exercise

their authority should the need arise. Although the Governor would

constitutionally be subject to direction from London it would be

difficult for him to act against the wish of the Executive and

Legislative Council who would by then be indirectly elected and who

would themselves have elected the Governor. Moreover, the Chinese

might object. They want us to retain control in Hong Kong until

1997 and might see this as

indication that we an

were divesting

ourselves of responsibility for the territory. They might also

think we were going

far in allowing the local people to choose

senior officials.

9.

Under option (c) there would in effect be a constitutional

"Head of State" and an elected Prime Minister who would run the

Government, corresponding to but expanding the role of Chief Secretary. There might or might not be a subsidiary ministerial

system below that.

Advantages

(a)

Britain's ability to discharge their responsibility for Hong Kong in an emergency would be retained.

(b) There would be an elected head of Government who could become

the Chief Executive of the SAR after 1997. Provided that the

Chinese agreed, the post of Governor would wither away.

(c)

It should be more acceptable to

to the Chinese than an elected

Governor.