TNAG-1313-FCO40-1688-Future-of-Hong-Kong-views-and-involvement-of-Australia--Cana-1984 — Page 197

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CONFIDENTIAL

d)

CAMBODIA

Mr Hadwen saw no change (despite French views) in Vietnamese behaviour. The Australian position was worrying. What was the significance of Ambassador Bai's call? I saw no change in the Vietnamese position. ASEAN were holding up well; we should back them. The Australians had not backed down; but nor did they seem out to make difficulties for is at UNGA. Mr Hadwen thought the vote on Cambodia would come out much like last year's.

e) INDIA

f)

g)

If so,

Mr Hadwen asked whether India was falling apart? were there new openings for the Russians? I said "no" to both; Mrs Gandhi was determined to win her election, and would. Indian bias in favour of the Soviet Union was a great nuisance but it was a known quantity. Mr Hadwen (as former High Commissioner in Delhi) paid tribute to Sir J Thomson's work in keeping open Western lines to the

Indians.

PAKISTAN

I saw more problems here.

Difficult transition in prospect.

We had to keep up Pakistan's morale. But press reports of a coordinated Indian/Soviet squeeze did not, to my knowledge, have a basis. Cross-border incursions had been scene-setting for the Cordovez talks.

AFGHANISTAN

Mr Hadwen said that we should never get the Russians out. I said this might be so; but, if they stayed, we should make them pay the heaviest possible price. Mr Hadwen agreed we should keep up the pressure. But he queried the morality or wisdom of Western arms supplies to the Mujahideen.

h) NEPAL

Mr Hadwen assumed we were keeping up the Gurkha relationship and aid. I said I had seen nothing to the contrary.

i)

SRI LANKA

He said the Indians should keep their hands off. I agreed heartily.

j) PACIFIC BASIN

I took the opportunity to mention Ambassador Fairbanks' (US) call on me. Mr Hadwen shared my personal scepticism but

CONFIDENTIAL

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