TNAG-1313-FCO40-1688-Future-of-Hong-Kong-views-and-involvement-of-Australia--Cana-1984 — Page 196

наскональ

CONFIDENTIAL

RECEIVED IN WY

Mr. Pomy Ja ina-

14SEP 1984

Ro

DESK OPHION INDEX

GP=RY

Action Taken

TAVE

From: JDI Boyd 24

Date: 11 September 1984

Mr Elliott

Far Eastern Department

cc: Mr Galsworthy HKD

Mr Hartland-Swann SEAD

Mr Wood SAD

Mr Chick SPD

Planning Staff Mr Marshall NAD

LUNCH WITH CANADIAN DIRECTOR-GENERAL FOR EAST ASIA

1.

The Canadian High Commission asked me to lunch on 10 September to meet Mr Hadwen who had just been at Ditchley and was making a number of calls in London. In the course of a wide-ranging discussion (I did my best) the following points arose:

a) KOREA

b)

c)

Mr Hadwen was concerned about North Korea's unpredictability; otherwise, he made no concrete points.

CHINA (AND HONG KONG)

Mr Hadwen said the future Chinese policy was uncertain. Canadian businessmen were bullish. But he saw internal strains on agricultural policy and the PLA were not entirely content with their position. Things were set fair for the

5 years. After that who knew? However, the UK had presumably calculated all this in relation to Hong Kong.

next 3

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I said that history taught caution on China. The UK did not base policy decisions on speculation. As Mr Galsworthy would have indicated, a care for good order and public confidence - not futurology - determined our attitude to 1997. This said, I was more optimistic than Mr Hadwen. Personality rather than the line was the key to Chinese politics. Teng and his followers seemed strongly placed. In the end of course nothing would succeed like the success of their policies.

HONG KONG

Mr Hadwen made passing reference to the future of Canadian passport-holders of Chinese race and to the interests of Canadian Pacific Airways. I said there would be adjustments for us all; but Hong Kong would be British until 1997.

CONFIDENTIAL

/d)