TNAG-1311-FCO40-1673-Future-of-Hong-Kong-1984 — Page 60

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Reference

CODE IS 77

Miss Blayney

I send herewith the uncorrected proofs of Volume XXI, Second Series,

of Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939. This volume relates to Far Eastern affairs between November 1936 and August 1938. Its publication will complete Series II of the Collection and link up with Volumes VIII and IX of Series III, already published (Far Eastern developments, August 1938 to September 1939). The present volume deals essentially with the British Government's defence of British interests before and following the new Japanese offensive against China which began in July 1937.

Since a major crisis with Japan was ruled out by the situation in Europe British policy had to be firm but discreet, insisting on British rights and interests without allowing single-handed confrontation to develop into open breach. Much of the volume is made up of exchanges with the Japanese Foreign Office on these lines. In the same way the desire to help China and encourage her resistance was strong, but qualified by the determination to do nothing to infuriate the Japanese. This meant that while China could not be given a loan she could be helped in such matters as the development of the Burma road as a safe route for military supplies. In the circumstances French, Russian, and above all American reactions were of great importance. The British Government professed willingness for bolder action providing that the United States would guarantee support, but there were tantalizingly coy responses from Washington to British pressure in various test cases in favour of joint, as distinct from parallel, representations against Japanese acts of aggression. The French also refused to move without full American backing.

These issues were further defined at the Brussels conference of November 1937, which marked the culmination of the first phase of international action in the crisis. The attempt of the delegates to find a satisfactory settlement of Sino-Japanese differences was completely frustrated by Japan's refusal to participate, but the conference was kept going for three weeks by President Roosevelt as a means of educating Ameican public opinion. It failed to do this, but the necessarily academic discussions which took place produced

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