TNAG-1286-FCO40-16372-Constitutional-development-in-Hong-Kong.-Part-2-of-2-1984 — Page 282

(ii)

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9.

The major risks cannot be ruled out, however unlikely,

but little account should be taken of them. Extra-

ordinary and unforeseeable events can only be met by exceptional measures. It is impossible to devise

constitutional measures that could eliminate them.

Elected Chief Minister rather than elected Governor?

The last issue to be considered is whether it would be safer

to have a resident Governor, appointed on traditional lines

with de jure powers, alongside

an elected

Chief Minister (in place of an elected Governor). It is

suggested that this might be a more effective arrangement for

HMG to discharge authoritatively its responsibilities.

would also provide a continued, if symbolic, assurance of

Britain's commitment to Hong Kong until 1997.

Arguments against:

(i)

It

it would undermine the political goal of entrusting autonomous powers of government overtly to the chosen representatives of the Hong Kong people;

(ii) it might provide the Chinese with the excuse of

matching him by appointed Governor from Peking

after 1997;

(iii) in reality it would not make any difference to the

incidence of the risks identified or to the effectiveness

of the measures that could be taken to control them:

-

Į influence and advice could be as easily

1

exercised from London or by CBF or by a Resident British Commissioner or by the Joint Group.

intelligence and information should be readily,

obtainable by HMG in London from the same on-the-

spot sources,

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