TNAG-1265-FCO40-1612-Future-of-Hong-Kong-despatch-on--The-Hong-Kong-Negotiations--1983 — Page 26

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variant of full confrontation.

Its only attraction would be in

a situation in which the Chinese insisted on terms so vague or

so unpalatable that we could not accept them or put them to

Parliament, but in which we wished to give them the maximum

possible opportunity to think again or, after a pause, resume

practical cooperation with us. In practice, it would probably

merge into full confrontation.

By

23. The third course, which I recognise will only be possible

if the Chinese can be persuaded to take it with us, is that we

should do all we can in negotiation and subsequently in cooperation

with the Chinese to make their plan as tolerable as possible.

this I mean seek the maximum degree of autonomy, the maximum

continuity and the maximum guarantees consistent with cooperation.

We should thereby be discharging our responsibility to the

inhabitants of Hong Kong as best we could. We should be giving

the Special Administrative Region as fair a wind as possible.

And we should avoid lasting damage to Sino-British relations.

But the disadvantages should not be underestimated. We should

be involved in the unpalatable business of pushing through a plan

which we knew to be far from ideal. We should certainly be

accused of a sell-out. We must expect a rundown in the Hong Kong

economy, for which the Chinese would blame us, and we must expect

also even in this case some outflow of Chinese inhabitants and

attendant immigration problems at home.

increasingly difficult to administer and, even given our wish to

cooperate, the Chinese would be unlikely to prove easy bedfellows.

Hong Kong would become

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17.

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