MON
SECRET
variant of full confrontation.
Its only attraction would be in
a situation in which the Chinese insisted on terms so vague or
so unpalatable that we could not accept them or put them to
Parliament, but in which we wished to give them the maximum
possible opportunity to think again or, after a pause, resume
practical cooperation with us. In practice, it would probably
merge into full confrontation.
By
23. The third course, which I recognise will only be possible
if the Chinese can be persuaded to take it with us, is that we
should do all we can in negotiation and subsequently in cooperation
with the Chinese to make their plan as tolerable as possible.
this I mean seek the maximum degree of autonomy, the maximum
continuity and the maximum guarantees consistent with cooperation.
We should thereby be discharging our responsibility to the
inhabitants of Hong Kong as best we could. We should be giving
the Special Administrative Region as fair a wind as possible.
And we should avoid lasting damage to Sino-British relations.
But the disadvantages should not be underestimated. We should
be involved in the unpalatable business of pushing through a plan
which we knew to be far from ideal. We should certainly be
accused of a sell-out. We must expect a rundown in the Hong Kong
economy, for which the Chinese would blame us, and we must expect
also even in this case some outflow of Chinese inhabitants and
attendant immigration problems at home.
increasingly difficult to administer and, even given our wish to
cooperate, the Chinese would be unlikely to prove easy bedfellows.
Hong Kong would become
SECRET
17.
/It