TNAG-1257-FCO40-1590-Third-countries-and-the-future-of-Hong-Kong-1983 — Page 116

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CALL ON PROFESSOR NAKAJIMA, TOKYO FOREIGN LANGUAGE UNIVERSITY

1. Mr Walker of Research Department and I called on Professor Nakajima of Tokyo Foreign Language University on Thursday 27 October. Professor Nakajima is a China expert. The following were the main points from our conversation.

2.

Professor Nakajima said his main current preoccupation was the future of Hong Kong, on which he was inclined to take a rather pessi- mistic view. In his opinion, Hu Yaobang and his followers, who were now the policy makers in China, had no concept of how capitalism worked, and thus no idea of what was required to maintain Hong Kong's stability and prosperity. Hu was, in ideological terms, a straight- forward Stalinist. He had earlier led the Communist youth movement, and had assembled a group of similar views and background who were now moving into positions of influence; among them were Hu Quli,,who had come up through the Student Federation, Qian Qichen, Chen Xichen and the Foreign Minister, Wu Xueqian. Nakajima himself had met Hu Quli when he was a "leader'

a "leader" of the Japanese student radicals and Hu was leading the Chinese Student Federation. This group were ideologically pro-Soviet. Evidence for their Stalinist tendencies was provided by the fact that there had been 10,000 public executions in China in recent months.

3.

Mr Walker wondered whether this supposed "pro-Soviet" group were as influential as Professor Nakajima suggested. What about the rise of Zhao Ziyang, who was certainly not a Hu Yaobang follower? Professo Nakajima argued that Zhao's appointment was the result of a political compromise; Zhao was not in Deng's camp either, but a follower of Tao Zhu. Furthermore, he was a moderator and negotiator, not a decis- ion maker. He did not, as was popularly supposed, have much economic role either; economic policy was in the hands of others, particularly Chen Yun. Zhao could be expected in time to fade quietly from the

scene.

Mr Walker asked about Sino-Soviet relations. Professor Nakajima thought that a significantly closer relationship between the two countries was extremely likely in the longer term. There would be no return to the monolithic relationship of the Fifties, but as two Communist states facing similar domestic economic problems, some mutual interdependence was inevitable. China could not rely on eco- nomic assistance from the West alone.

5. As we left, Professor Nakajima gave us a copy of his recent "Japan Quarterly" article, entitled "China may return to the Soviet Bloc". It is attached. You may like to glance at it; I found it interesting and readable. It argues that, for China, the process of "de Maoization" involves not just new internal policies but also a new foreign policy of which the move towards a Sino-Soviet rapproche- ment is but one manifestation. The present generation of leaders have a fundamentally different view of the Soviet Union from their pre- decessors during Mao's days, and see the Soviet Union as the only realistic model for China's economic development. It is "only a matter of time before the two countries repair their relations" and

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