TNAG-1256-FCO40-1589-Third-countries-and-the-future-of-Hong-Kong-1983 — Page 38

471

Accord

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TT PEKING

GRS 240

SECRET

TELELETTER

FROM W MORRIS, HONG KONG DEPT

SECRET

FILE REF HKK 040/5 DATED 27 OCT 83

HKK 040/S FRECEIVED IN REGISTRY

CATE

1 W 1983

DECK

INDEX

FICER

PA

27659 - 1.

kim

for CMal!!

FOLLOWING FOR S J GOMERSALL ESQ, WASHINGTON

AND TO MR COX, FED

COPIED TO R P MARGOLIS ESQ, DEPUTY POLITICAL ADVISER, HONG KONG

AND TO T W M SMITH ESQ, PEKING

CHINESE FOREIGN MINISTER'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON: HONG KONG

1. THANK YOU FOR YOUR TELELETTER OF 18 OCTOBER. THE LINE TAKEN

BY WOLFOWITZ AT THE ASIA SOCIETY LUNCH WAS GENERALLY HELPFUL

(EXCEPT PERHAPS FOR THE 'MAJOR EXODUS OF REFUGEES' POINTS).

2. THE POINTS PASSED ON TO YOU BY ANDERSON, ELABORATING ON YOUR

TELELETTER OF 14 OCTOBER TO COX, WERE IN LINE WITH WHAT WE KNOW

ALREADY, BUT I FOUND PARTICULARLY INTERESTING WU'S RECOGNITION

THAT THE QUESTION WAS 'PRIMARILY A MATTER OF TRUST' IN WHETHER

CHINA WOULD STICK TO ITS POLICY. THIS IS OF COURSE ONE OF THE

MAIN PROBLEMS ABOUT THE CHINESE SAR PLAN AND THE MAIN REASON WHY

SO MANY PEOPLE ARE SCEPTICAL OF IT.

3. I WAS INTRIGUED BY THE REFERENCE IN PARA 3 OF THE EARLIER

TELELETTER TO THE US GOVERNMENT GIVING FURTHER STUDY TO WHAT ROLE,

IF ANY, IT MIGHT PLAY OVER HONG KONG. (I NOTE THAT WOLFOWITZ

SAID AT THE ASIA SOCIETY LUNCH THAT 'THE US HAD DECIDED TO KEEP

OUT OF THE ISSUE'.) PERHAPS AS YOU SAY MR WOLFOWITZ WILL HAVE

ELABORATED ON THIS WITH MR LUCE.

4. ON THIS CALL IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF WE COULD HAVE AN EARLY

ACCOUNT, COPIED TO PEKING AND HONG KONG, OF WHAT WAS SAID TO

ENABLE US TO KEEP OUR RESPECTIVE US COLLEAGUES IN THE PICTURE.

SIGNED W MORRIS

re are tellyiple

milcend sexarately

we

pk/tik.

1

SECRET