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Accord
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TT PEKING
GRS 240
SECRET
TELELETTER
FROM W MORRIS, HONG KONG DEPT
SECRET
FILE REF HKK 040/5 DATED 27 OCT 83
HKK 040/S FRECEIVED IN REGISTRY
CATE
1 W 1983
DECK
INDEX
FICER
PA
27659 - 1.
kim
for CMal!!
FOLLOWING FOR S J GOMERSALL ESQ, WASHINGTON
AND TO MR COX, FED
COPIED TO R P MARGOLIS ESQ, DEPUTY POLITICAL ADVISER, HONG KONG
AND TO T W M SMITH ESQ, PEKING
CHINESE FOREIGN MINISTER'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON: HONG KONG
1. THANK YOU FOR YOUR TELELETTER OF 18 OCTOBER. THE LINE TAKEN
BY WOLFOWITZ AT THE ASIA SOCIETY LUNCH WAS GENERALLY HELPFUL
(EXCEPT PERHAPS FOR THE 'MAJOR EXODUS OF REFUGEES' POINTS).
2. THE POINTS PASSED ON TO YOU BY ANDERSON, ELABORATING ON YOUR
TELELETTER OF 14 OCTOBER TO COX, WERE IN LINE WITH WHAT WE KNOW
ALREADY, BUT I FOUND PARTICULARLY INTERESTING WU'S RECOGNITION
THAT THE QUESTION WAS 'PRIMARILY A MATTER OF TRUST' IN WHETHER
CHINA WOULD STICK TO ITS POLICY. THIS IS OF COURSE ONE OF THE
MAIN PROBLEMS ABOUT THE CHINESE SAR PLAN AND THE MAIN REASON WHY
SO MANY PEOPLE ARE SCEPTICAL OF IT.
3. I WAS INTRIGUED BY THE REFERENCE IN PARA 3 OF THE EARLIER
TELELETTER TO THE US GOVERNMENT GIVING FURTHER STUDY TO WHAT ROLE,
IF ANY, IT MIGHT PLAY OVER HONG KONG. (I NOTE THAT WOLFOWITZ
SAID AT THE ASIA SOCIETY LUNCH THAT 'THE US HAD DECIDED TO KEEP
OUT OF THE ISSUE'.) PERHAPS AS YOU SAY MR WOLFOWITZ WILL HAVE
ELABORATED ON THIS WITH MR LUCE.
4. ON THIS CALL IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF WE COULD HAVE AN EARLY
ACCOUNT, COPIED TO PEKING AND HONG KONG, OF WHAT WAS SAID TO
ENABLE US TO KEEP OUR RESPECTIVE US COLLEAGUES IN THE PICTURE.
SIGNED W MORRIS
re are tellyiple
milcend sexarately
we
pk/tik.
1
SECRET