TNAG-1256-FCO40-1589-Third-countries-and-the-future-of-Hong-Kong-1983 — Page 195

3. STRATEGIC ISSUES AND THE SOVIET UNION

WE INBERGER HAD GIVEN ZHANG A LONG EXPLANATION OF US STRATEGIC

THINKING. HE HAD EXPLAINED THE US POSITION IN THE INF NEGOTIATIONS

AND ASSURED THE CHINESE AGAIN THAT THE US WOULD NOT PREJUDICE

CHINESE INTERESTS IN ANY AGREEMENT WHICH MIGHT BE REACHED. HE

EXPLAINED THAT, WHILE THE ADMINISTRATION MAINTAINED THE GOAL OF THE ZERO OPTION, THEY WOULD ATTEMPT TO NEGOTIATE INTERIM REDUCTIONS IN SOVIET MISSILES BOTH IN EUROPE, AND IN THE SOVIET FAR EAST, WHERE THE PRIMARY SOVIET BUILD-UP WAS CURRENTLY TAKING

PLACE. THE US WOULD TAKE CHINESE INTERESTS INTO ACCOUNT AND HOPED

THAT THE CHINESE WOULD ALSO TAKE US INTERESTS INTO ACCOUNT.

(ANDERSON EXPLAINED THIS AS A HINT THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD

NOT WISH CHINA TO REACH A BILATERAL AGREEMENT WITH THE RUSSIANS

ON INTERMEDIATE NUCLEAR FORCES IN THE FAR EAST, THOUGH HE SAID

THAT THEY SAW NO EVIDENCE THAT CHINA WAS CONTEMPLATING THIS.)

THE CHINESE SAID VERY LITTLE IN REPLY. THEY UNDERTOOK TO STUDY

WE INBERGER'S REMARKS ABOUT THE STRATEGIC SITUATION, AND SAID

REPEATEDLY THAT THE UNITED STATES NEED NOT BE AFRAID THAT CHINA

FAILED TO UNDERSTAND FROM WHERE THE MAJOR THREAT CAME. THEY SAID

LITTLE ABOUT THEIR BILATERAL TALKS WITH THE RUSSIANS, AND DID

NOT COMMENT UPON THE US POSITION IN THE INF NEGOTIATIONS. THERE

WAS NO DISCUSSION OF STRATEGIC ARMS TALKS. IN RESPONSE TO WE INBERGER'S PRESENTATION ON CENTRAL AMERICA, AFRICA AND THE

MIDDLE EAST. THE CHINESE SAID THAT THEY WERE IN COMPLETE AGREEMENT

ABOUT RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE IN THESE AREAS, BUT THEY DISAGREED

WITH THE US RESPONSE, WHICH HAD HAD THE EFFECT OF STRENGTHENING THE SOVIET POSITION. WEINBERGER HAD EXPRESSED DISAPPOINTMENT AT

THE CHINESE DECISION TO ABSTAIN IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL VOTE ON

THE KAL DISASTER.

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