3. STRATEGIC ISSUES AND THE SOVIET UNION
WE INBERGER HAD GIVEN ZHANG A LONG EXPLANATION OF US STRATEGIC
THINKING. HE HAD EXPLAINED THE US POSITION IN THE INF NEGOTIATIONS
AND ASSURED THE CHINESE AGAIN THAT THE US WOULD NOT PREJUDICE
CHINESE INTERESTS IN ANY AGREEMENT WHICH MIGHT BE REACHED. HE
EXPLAINED THAT, WHILE THE ADMINISTRATION MAINTAINED THE GOAL OF THE ZERO OPTION, THEY WOULD ATTEMPT TO NEGOTIATE INTERIM REDUCTIONS IN SOVIET MISSILES BOTH IN EUROPE, AND IN THE SOVIET FAR EAST, WHERE THE PRIMARY SOVIET BUILD-UP WAS CURRENTLY TAKING
PLACE. THE US WOULD TAKE CHINESE INTERESTS INTO ACCOUNT AND HOPED
THAT THE CHINESE WOULD ALSO TAKE US INTERESTS INTO ACCOUNT.
(ANDERSON EXPLAINED THIS AS A HINT THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD
NOT WISH CHINA TO REACH A BILATERAL AGREEMENT WITH THE RUSSIANS
ON INTERMEDIATE NUCLEAR FORCES IN THE FAR EAST, THOUGH HE SAID
THAT THEY SAW NO EVIDENCE THAT CHINA WAS CONTEMPLATING THIS.)
THE CHINESE SAID VERY LITTLE IN REPLY. THEY UNDERTOOK TO STUDY
WE INBERGER'S REMARKS ABOUT THE STRATEGIC SITUATION, AND SAID
REPEATEDLY THAT THE UNITED STATES NEED NOT BE AFRAID THAT CHINA
FAILED TO UNDERSTAND FROM WHERE THE MAJOR THREAT CAME. THEY SAID
LITTLE ABOUT THEIR BILATERAL TALKS WITH THE RUSSIANS, AND DID
NOT COMMENT UPON THE US POSITION IN THE INF NEGOTIATIONS. THERE
WAS NO DISCUSSION OF STRATEGIC ARMS TALKS. IN RESPONSE TO WE INBERGER'S PRESENTATION ON CENTRAL AMERICA, AFRICA AND THE
MIDDLE EAST. THE CHINESE SAID THAT THEY WERE IN COMPLETE AGREEMENT
ABOUT RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE IN THESE AREAS, BUT THEY DISAGREED
WITH THE US RESPONSE, WHICH HAD HAD THE EFFECT OF STRENGTHENING THE SOVIET POSITION. WEINBERGER HAD EXPRESSED DISAPPOINTMENT AT
THE CHINESE DECISION TO ABSTAIN IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL VOTE ON
THE KAL DISASTER.
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