LUNIIDEN
have to be a further deployment of SS20s. Mr Blaker said that he believed this was a negotiating gambit. The Soviet Union knew that the British and French SLBMS were strategic and had conceded as much at the time of SALT I. They were balanced by Soviet SLBMs and not by SS20s.
4. Mr Matsunaga stated that the Nagano mission to the Soviet Union of 250 businessmen had reported that the Soviet Government appeared to be still studying the international situation and did not appear to have defined its policy objectives.
5. Mr Blaker asked Mr Matsunaga how he saw the Japanese defence policy developing. Mr Matsunaga said that they were moving steadily towards the goal of a stronger defence but in doing so they had to observe the constitutional limitations. They anticipated greater cooperation with the US in the field of defence technology. They had agreed to protect sea lanes out to 1,000 miles but had not yet looked at the methods to be employed. They would be doing this shortly with the United States. Mr Nakasone's remarks in the United States, for example, about Japan being an "unsinkable aircraft carrier", represented his own thinking and didn't affect the basic. position; they were a means of inviting discussion. He hoped they would not disturb the Chinese and the South East Asians. The Soviet Union had commented to the Nagano mission that they signalled a military revitalisation but the ASEAN nations appeared more concerned that it would mean Japan was less able to give them economic aid.
MR YOSHINO
6.
Opening the meeting Mr Yoshino apologised that Mr Tanikawa could not himself be present because the passage of the Budget through the Lower House on that day required his presence in Parliament.
7. The Falklands. Mr Yoshino opened the discussion by affirming Japan's interest in the UK despite the distance between the two countries. He then raised the question of the Falklands campaign. Mr Blaker said that the conduct of military operations had been examined and judged to have been satisfactory. In addition, the Franks Committee which had examined events leading up to the crisis had concluded that the invasion had been decided on only a very short time before it took place. There had been some problems over rela-
A tions with the media and this was the subject of further study. number of lessons had been learnt from the campaign. The most impor- tant was that deterrence had to be credible to succeed. We were now maintaining a sizeable garrison on the Islands including Naval and Air Forces and would continue to do so as long as necessary.
It was difficult to contemplate negotiations with Argentina at present. She had not yet agreed that hostilities were over and insisted that
This was negotiations should include the question of sovereignty. unacceptable so soon after a war and to Islanders who were all of British descent.
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
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