TNAG-1252-FCO40-1585-Third-countries-and-the-future-of-Hong-Kong-1983 — Page 131

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CONFIDENTIAL

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22 MAR 1983

D/MIN(AF)/PB/15/7/8

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MR NOBUO MATSUNAGA, VICE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

MR MINORU YOSHINO, ADMINISTRATIVE VICE MINISTER OF DEFENCE, AND ADMIRAL TSUGIO YATA, CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT STAFF COUNCIL ON 7 AND 8 MARCH 1983

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On all three calls Minister(AF) was accompanied by the Ambassador Sir Hugh Cortazzi, and his Private Secretary, R P Craine.

MR MATSUNAGA

1. Opening the discussion Mr Blaker said that Japan and the United Kingdom had many common interests, particularly the preservation of freedom,

and access to markets and raw materials. Machinery existed for regular contact on economic matters but not to the same extent on defence matters. While Chiefs of Staff exchanged visits and there were contacts at a lower level between the Services, dialogue at Ministerial level was infrequent and should be increased. Mr Matsunaga said that he shared this view. Security was inseparable from other matters. He too hoped for more contacts at both military

and political levels.

2. Mr Matsunaga raised the question of the West German elections and said he hoped the result would strengthen the West's position in the INF negotiations. Mr Blaker said it was an important result in this respect. He believed that Mr Andropov's moves so far had been only preliminary ones and that he would not reveal his true position until he had tested the West's determination. It was therefore necessary to proceed with plans to deploy Cruise missiles and Pershing in the absence of an agreement. The 'zero option' was by far the best form of agreement as it would eliminate a whole class of weapons.

While this remained our ultimate aim it might be neces- sary to consider something less as an interim step. We would not accept a move of SS20s to the East of the Urals as they might still be able to reach Western Europe and could certainly be moved back quite quickly. It would also increase the threat to Japan. Any missiles withdrawn from Europe would have to be destroyed. Mr Matsunaga said that Mr Schulz had assured the Japanese that the INF negotiations would take into account the global effects of any reduction. The Japanese strongly supported the 'zero option' and were most concerned that there should be no increase in the number of SS20s capable of reaching Japan.

3. Mr Matsunaga said he understood that Mr Cheysson had been told by Mr Gromyko during his recent visit to Moscow that the Soviet Union considered it necessary to deploy SS20s to balance the UK and French missiles and that if Cruise and Pershing were deployed there would

CONFIDENTIAL

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