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K. B. Bucknall 123
acceptably barren, and currently not being prepared to come to terms with the U.S.S.R, its best bet is to wrest the leadership from it and leave the U.S.S.R. isolated both from the socialist and non- socialist countries of the world.
Number 21, The Taiwan Supplant, is also possible, if the Taiwan leadership can be persuaded to deal and agree to some form of organized return to Beijing's sovereignty, which might involve a semi-autonomous status. In this case Taiwan might grow to replace Hong Kong as an assistant to China.
Number 23, Third World Leadership, again relies on a future break between China and the U.S., but instead of China aiming to gain control of the socialist world, it decides this is too difficult or impossible, and that an casier solution would be to change its allegiance to the Third World. The only country of First World status other than the U.S. is the Soviet Union, unacceptable to China as an ally; the Second World, the industrialized countries of the West, does not appear as a strong unified group that would back China against either the U.S. or the U.S.S.R. if a crisis came; and although the Third World can supply neither economic sup- port in the form of technology and capital nor military muscle in the event of war, it might be felt in China that the political pres- sure it can apply might be the best that China can achieve. If China is to rely on the Third World it would probably prefer to lead it.
Number 25, Abandoning the Baby, depends heavily upon political attitudes in the United Kingdom. There is questioning there of the remnants of the old colonial days such as Hong Kong and Gibraltar and the long-running problem of Northern Ireland to- gether with the recent problem of the Falkland Islands. Events in other colonies and British-owned areas can impinge upon the Hong Kong situation; if serious problems should emerge elsewhere, then the United Kingdom may withdraw quite rapidly from places such as Hong Kong. The way has been cleared to some extent by the passage of the Nationalities Bill in Britain in October 1981 which excludes the right of the citizens of British Dependent Territories (Hong Kong and the Falkland Islands) to move to Britain and establish residence. It is highly probable that any such rapid with- drawal by Britain would require close consultation with and per- haps the approval of the U.S., and it would reflect a major change in influence in Asia with possible repercussions on the balance of power.
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