TNAG-1212-FCO40-1515-Crimes-and-sentences-in-Hong-Kong--including-death-sentences-1982 — Page 127

in respect of that act, even though

all may have been engaged in an

unlawful purpose, see R.

V.

Anderson,

R. V. Morris [1966] 2 Q.B. 110

and R. v. Loversey, R. V. Peterson

[1970] 1 Q.B. 352.

(c)

Even if that other person knew the weapons

being taken in circumstances which could

or would cause grievous bodily harm, if

one or more participants develops an intention

to kill, then, although he (or they) can be

convicted of murder, the other participants

can only be convicted of manslaughter, see

R. v. Smith (1963) 1 W.L.R. 1200 and

[1976] 62 C.A.R. 109.

R.

V.

Reid

(a)

(i)

There is an old authority, Pleas of

of the Crown by Foster where, at pages

369/370 he suggests that if the offence

committed by the perpetrator is a

natural and probable consequence of

following an instigator's instructions,

(in this case on the finding of the

jury Your Petitioner could be said to

be the instigator) then that instigator

is liable. This was approved by Byles J.

in Parkes v. Precott (1860) L.R. 4

Ex. 169 at 182. However, this last

rule may well now be varied or controlled

-16-