in respect of that act, even though
all may have been engaged in an
unlawful purpose, see R.
V.
Anderson,
R. V. Morris [1966] 2 Q.B. 110
and R. v. Loversey, R. V. Peterson
[1970] 1 Q.B. 352.
(c)
Even if that other person knew the weapons
being taken in circumstances which could
or would cause grievous bodily harm, if
one or more participants develops an intention
to kill, then, although he (or they) can be
convicted of murder, the other participants
can only be convicted of manslaughter, see
R. v. Smith (1963) 1 W.L.R. 1200 and
[1976] 62 C.A.R. 109.
R.
V.
Reid
(a)
(i)
There is an old authority, Pleas of
of the Crown by Foster where, at pages
369/370 he suggests that if the offence
committed by the perpetrator is a
natural and probable consequence of
following an instigator's instructions,
(in this case on the finding of the
jury Your Petitioner could be said to
be the instigator) then that instigator
is liable. This was approved by Byles J.
in Parkes v. Precott (1860) L.R. 4
Ex. 169 at 182. However, this last
rule may well now be varied or controlled
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