TNAG-1175-FCO40-1477-Proposed-replacement-airport-for-Hong-Kong-at-Deep-Bay-or-Ch-1982 — Page 74

1. PA.

2 Bv. 18

noted pan 2012

My 2017

SECRET

Mr CHÍ

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Mr. Hoare

Mick Referenes).

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26

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REPLACEMENT AIRPORT

1.

Thank you. I shd like to

apter 1 August pl Bish

I she like to discusp of this

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You asked for my observations on Mr McLaren's letter

at (26).

Continuing

2. I should start by confessing my preference for Deep Bay over Chek Lap Kok. While I accept thể strength of the arguments on which Deep Bay was rejected, things have now moved so fast on "the future" that they may not be valid for much longer. If an acceptable deal is made on the future, this will almost certainly involve a closer degree of general cooperation with the Chinese than has hitherto been the case, and we may already have paid the price for this in the form of concessions over air services. Moreover, I find it hard to believe that the situation will deteriorate to guch a aise point that China will wish to interfere with aircraft move- ments at a Deep Bay airport, but not with Chek Lap Kok (or Kai Tak) and not with say, food and water supplies, on which Hong Kong is heavily dependent (and which were not affected in 1967).

3.

I would go further and suggest that the political implications of siting an airport at Deep Bay, by the very factor of the greater cross-border cooperation required, would be strongly favourable to confidence in the future. This would also be a sign of willingness to cooperate with the Chinese who clearly wish to have an airport to serve Shenzhen (this is a development about which much more seems to be known in Hong Kong than here). I really cannot see the point of us building ane aiport (at Chek Lap Kok) and them another on the other side of the border. This may be a point that they will raise at some stage: it could also be a useful sweetener in talks on the future. At my rate, we should be alone to the possibility

4.

Finally, I would emphasise that the Civil Aviation Department take a narrow approach to aviation matters and are not well-known for their ability to take a wider political view. This can be seen in their efforts to push for Chek Lap Kok on technical grounds and for an early decision on the second airport: hence the references in (23) and (24) to

earlier dates than we have had in mind. As I have send before, this

could become contaraning; a word in somcore's ler at a

convenient time

be weesssary.

CODE 18-77

SS 8/78

19 July 1982

SECRET

Rich offpone

R J F Hoare