(3)
VI. A DEEP BAY AIRPORT COULD ALSO SERVE SHENZHEN.
6. AT THE MEETING WHICH THE CHIEF SECRETARY HELD LAST WEEK
THERE WAS GENERAL AGREEMENT THAT:
A. A FULL FEASIBILITY STUDY WOULD TAKE NEARER THREE THAN TWO
YEARS TO REACH THE PRESENT STAGE OF CHEK LAP KOK STUDIES. A
DECISION ON WHETHER AND WHERE TO BUILD A REPLACEMENT AIRPORT
COULD SCARCELY BE TAKEN BEFORE EARLY 1985 IF A FULL
INVESTIGATION OF THE DEEP BAY OPTION HAD TO BE COMPLETED FIRST.
B. A DELAY OF THREE YEARS MIGHT NOT MATTER TOO MUCH SINCE (1) WE MIGHT BE ABLE TO CARRY ON WITH KAI TAK FOR A FEW EXTRA YEARS WITHOUT GREAT DIFFICULTY: AND (11) WE SHOULD
PROBABLY NOT WISH TO DECIDE FINALLY ON BUILDING A NEW AIRPORT
IN ADVANCE OF AN AGREEMENT WITH THE CHINESE ABOUT THE
FUTURE.
C. OTHER THINGS BEING EQUAL, THE DEVELOPMENTAL AND OTHER
ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF DEEP BAY WERE SUFFICIENTLY STRONG TO
JUSTIFY A FULL FEASIBILITY STUDY.
7. BUT IN THE MAJORITY VIEW THE POLITICAL ARGUMENTS AGAINST
FURTHER EXPLORATION OF DEEP BAY WERE COMPELLING.
8. AS YOU WILL HAVE SEEN, THE CONSULTANTS TOOK THE VIEW THAT
WHICHEVER RUNWAY CONFIGURATION WAS CHOSEN
1. IT WOULD BE ESSENTIAL TO SECURE CONTROL OVER AN AREA
OF CHINESE AIRSPACE COVERING PART OF THE SHENZHEN SEZ:
11. BUILDING HEIGHT RESTRICTIONS WOULD HAVE TO BE ENFORCED
IN AN AREA OF CHINESE TERRITORY ADJACENT TO THE BORDER:
11. IF SCHEME B WAS ADOPTED OVER-FLYING OF CHINESE
ISLANDS WOULD BE MORE REGULAR AND AT MUCH LOWER LEVELS THAN
AT PRESENT.
IV. THERE WOULD BE A RISK OF AIRCRAFT STRAYING ACROSS THE
BORDER (AT ONE POINT THE APPROACH PATH IS ONLY 800 METRES FROM THE BORDER).
9. THESE POINTS, AND MORE GENERALLY THE PROXIMITY OF THE DEEP BAY SITE TO CHINA, WOULD MEAN IN PRACTICE THAT A DEEP BAY
AIRPORT COULD ONLY BE BUILT IN CLOSE COOPERATION WITH THE
CHINESE AUTHORITIES, IF NOT IN PARTNERSHIP WITH THEM.
10. THE PROBLEMS TO WHICH THIS WOULD GIVE RISE SHOULD NOT
BE INSOLUABLE IN THE PRESENT STATE OF OUR RELATIONS WITH CHINA.
BUT THERE WOULD BE SERIOUS DISADVANTAGES:
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