TNAG-1174-FCO40-1476-Proposed-replacement-airport-for-Hong-Kong-at-Deep-Bay-or-Ch-1982 — Page 14

CONFIDENTIAL

2.

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND ISSUES

Subsequent sections list findings and issues apropriate to specific study disciplines. Illustrations are located at the end of this section. Following paragraphs summarize:

2.1

RUNWAY ALIGNMENTS AND AIR ROUTES

Only alignments generally parallel to

to the Deep Bay southern shoreline meet the constraints of Para 1.3 for approaches from the southwest.

Only alignments generally parallel to the territorial border

be served with potentially acceptable approaches from the northeast.

Three runway positions were proposed. The three runways were combined into two systems of pairs of runways designated Scheme "A" and Scheme "B" (See Figure 2-1).

Scheme "A" fully meets the constraints of Para 1.3.

Scheme "B" requires overflight of the Chinese island of Nei Ling Ting (Tung Wan) during approaches from the southwest, unlike current operations over Chinese islands associated with Kai Tak. Scheme "B" does not meet the requirements of Para 1.3 (See Figure 2-4) although operations are within airspace currently controlled by Hong Kong.

A runway generally aligned parallel to the border and located to minimize Northwest New Territories development impact is common to both schemes.

It would be possible to develop Scheme "A", which has limited capacity, preserving an option to convert to Scheme "B" of far greater capacity, if suitable air navigation rights can be assured. Scheme "A" is illustrated at Figure 2-1 with the second runway of Scheme "B" superimposed to demonstrate an arrangement of facilities that would preserve the option. (Also shown on the sketch is a relocated version of Scheme "A" briefly examined iteration to reduce noise impact.)

in a late

There is a degree of incompatibility between a Deep Bay airport and current RAF tactical requirements near the border suggesting a need for further consultation with the Secretary for Security.

The tracks required for operations to the northeast from the northern runway of both Schemes and from the southern runway of Scheme "A" lie 800m to the south of the nearest land border with mainland China. (See Figures 2-2 and 2-3). Infrequent incursions across the border during missed approaches may be expected, although the risk could be reduced by the provision of additional non-standard instrumentation.

2-1

CONFIDENTIAL