Redacted under FOI exemptions 23 or 24
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-3-
B
C D
(358) (stad)
E
373
370
British Tactics
8. Both the Governor and HM Ambassador, Peking have recently given
their views on how we should proceed. (Hong Kong Telnos 647 and
648 and Peking Telno 353). The Governor suggests that there should
be some prior education of the Chinese on the importance of
continuing British administration, possibly through a visit by
himself to China. The Ambassador has doubts, which we share.
We have replied that preliminary discussions with the Chinese
cannot be considered until the Prime Minister's views are known.
We have agreed with the Governor and HM Ambassador, Peking that,
subject to the views of Ministers, it is probably right to make
the minimum objective for the Prime Minister's visit an agreement
with the Chinese to hold subsequent discussions between officials.
We have pointed out that, in this case, it would be wrong to
pre-empt the Prime Minister in any way (FCO Telno 473).
9.
Since our Telno 473 was sent, HM Ambassador, Peking has
reported a conversation with the Chinese Vice Foreign Minister
(Peking Telno 355). The line taken by Zhang is fairly encouraging.
It confirms that the Chinese attach importance to the continuance
of prosperity and stability in Hong Kong and suggests they are
tending to the view that detailed discussion of the problem should
take place after and not during the Prime Minister's visit.
But the fact remains that even if we are able to use the card
of a concession on sovereignty we shall face hard bargaining
K
from the Chinese on how such a change should be demonstrated
in practice.
In other words, political considerations may
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