TNAG-1167-FCO40-1447-Future-of-Hong-Kong-1982 — Page 13

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DSR 11C

unilateral withdrawal is not really open to us.

From the most negative viewpoint, a British pull-out

would create enormous problems for us. Our political

and economic interests in the Far East would suffer and

we would be faced with demands from Hong Kong people

for guarantees of protection and, more than likely,

for the right of admission of fairly large numbers to

this country.

6.

confidence.

We therefore need to try to bring the Chinese to

agree to continuing British administration, not indef- initely but for a sufficient period of time to maintain

They will not of course agree to this

without a price; that is likely to focus on the question

of sovereignty, on which their recent remarks put much

stress. Here I think it would be in our interests to be

as flexible as possible. We can only maintain sovereign

powers in the New Territories up to 1997 in any case

and the rest of the Territory is not viable on its own.

The fact that we entered into a lease on the New

Territories in 1898 was a recognition that ultimate

If we sovereignty in these areas rested with China.

could come to an arrangement whereby we made some sort

or recognition of Chinese sovereignty over the rest

of the Territory (ie Hong Kong Island and Kowloon)

while still retaining the right to administer the

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/Territory