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DSR 11C
unilateral withdrawal is not really open to us.
From the most negative viewpoint, a British pull-out
would create enormous problems for us. Our political
and economic interests in the Far East would suffer and
we would be faced with demands from Hong Kong people
for guarantees of protection and, more than likely,
for the right of admission of fairly large numbers to
this country.
6.
confidence.
We therefore need to try to bring the Chinese to
agree to continuing British administration, not indef- initely but for a sufficient period of time to maintain
They will not of course agree to this
without a price; that is likely to focus on the question
of sovereignty, on which their recent remarks put much
stress. Here I think it would be in our interests to be
as flexible as possible. We can only maintain sovereign
powers in the New Territories up to 1997 in any case
and the rest of the Territory is not viable on its own.
The fact that we entered into a lease on the New
Territories in 1898 was a recognition that ultimate
If we sovereignty in these areas rested with China.
could come to an arrangement whereby we made some sort
or recognition of Chinese sovereignty over the rest
of the Territory (ie Hong Kong Island and Kowloon)
while still retaining the right to administer the
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