(DEFENCE AND EXTERNAL AFFAIRS SUB-COMMITTEE)
9 December 1975] Mr C A WHITMORE, Air Vice Marshal
J GINGELL and Rear Admiral F W HEARN
69. How can we assist the strategic situation in any way if we have no air- craft or Navy to assist in operations in the Eastern Mediterranean or the Medi- terranean at all? -Our feeling is that certainly looking at the Mediterranean area and the southern flank of NATO as it is at the moment, with all the poli- tical uncertainties which stretch the whole length of the Mediterranean, if we were to add to that uncertainty by no longer being in Cyprus and by no longer providing a presence there, this would probably have more of a destabi- lising effect than if we were to continue to stay in the island. This is always a difficult area because it involves making judgments about what happens if you are no longer in a place, and manifestly the only way you can put this to the test is by leaving. Our view at the moment in the light of the present situation in that part of the world is that by simply being there we do have a contribution to make to the general stability of the area. (Air Vice-Marshal Gingell.) As long as you have an airfield such as Akrotiri and as long as you have a radar which is tied into the *** air defence ground environment you have the potential of making a significant contri- bution.
Mr Conlan
70. The RAF has virtually evacuated from Cyprus. Given that a presence in Cyprus is still necessary, why do we persist with two Sovereign Base Areas 60 miles apart with all the duplication that goes with that? For instance, there are two hospitals both of which are substantially underused? -(Mr Whit- more.) At the moment in the present political circumstances in the island, whatever the arguments, and I agree they are powerful, for rationalisation to the extent of concentrating in one Sovereign Base Area, we would find it very difficult to give up one of them. If we gave up a Sovereign Base Area we could only do so by handing it back to the Government of the Republic of Cyprus. Our view is that this would give rise to a lot of local difficulties between the two communi- ties, and probably bring about an increase in tension when all our efforts are direc- ted to reducing tension. There is a further point about not giving up one of the Sovereign Base Areas at the present
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time. If you assume that you are going to stay in the remaining Sovereign Base Area for a reasonable period of time you would have to re-provide in that Sovereign Base Area certain of the faci- lities which are now in the one you are giving up, but which would in some form or another have to be continued in the remaining area, and this would involve substantial capital expenditure, which is not something we would wish to incur when our tenure in the island is uncertain.
71. Is that not what is being done now? There is rationalisation taking place now with our Army units being transferred from Dhekhalia to Akrotiri. I recognise the force of your political arguments in the present unsettled situa- tion, but given that there is going to be a settlement between the two communi- ties one day, would it not make greater sense to concentrate in the western SBA?- -I think that you could carry a process of concentration to a certain point, but so long as you continue with a second Sovereign Base Area and do not give it up altogether you will have to maintain certain facilities in it. You will have to garrison it. You cannot say that we will continue to hold on to the SBA but not have a presence in it. So long as you need to keep troops in both SBAs there is a minimum of facilities which you will have to have in both of them. That is not to say, as you will have observed during your visit, that you cannot concentrate more on one than the other. That is a process through which we are going now as part of the run down in the island,
72. Perhaps I did not make myself clear. What I am suggesting is that there is a strong case, apart from the political considerations, of relinquishing alto- gether our presence at Dhekhalia, and concentrating all the existing facilities at Dhekhalia at Akrotiri. Is there anything at Dhekhalia that cannot be transferred to Akrotiri? -I would certainly have to look into that to give you a cate- gorical answer. There would certainly be, I know, a number of technical prob- lems arising from having a very heavy concentration of communications equip- ment in one Sovereign Base Area, rather than having them split, as they are now, between the two Sovereign Base Areas
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