TNAG-1154-FCO40-1434-Visits-by-Members-of-Parliament-(MPs)-to-Hong-Kong-1982 — Page 183

14

MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE EXPENDITURE COMMITTEE

[Continued

9 December 1975] Mr C A WHITMORE, Air Vice Marshal

J GINGELL and Rear Admiral F W HEARN

from transport aircraft, what aircraft are likely to use the very expensive facilities at Akrotiri, and how important is Cyprus to our support operations in Oman? I think, once we have left Malta, and let us say that is in 1979, as we are at present planning, when the present agreement comes to an end, we shall still want to use or to have the possibility of using Akrotiri, first as a staging post on the route to the Far East because we shall still have to be able to carry out trooping flights to Hong Kong and one possibility we are examining at the moment is that we will stage through Akrotiri; secondly, we will also probably use

use Akrotiri for staging aircraft which are going else- where, to the Middle East or to East Africa for example, on exercises; thirdly we shall probably want to make use of Akrotiri for operational training flights of the kind the RAF undertakes in a num- ber of places outside Europe; finally we may well want to continue to use Akro- tiri for reconnaissance flights.

63. What about Oman?- -At the moment, as you have been told, we use Akrotiri to support certain operations in Oman. This is a convenient thing to do because we are already in Cyprus, but if we had not got Akrotiri we could make other arrangements to support Oman. So our continued presence in Akrotiri is not essential to the support of operations in Oman.

64. I think you said that you were considering using Akrotiri as a staging post to Hong Kong. Does this imply that when Gan closes down you would, in fact, use Akrotiri as the only staging post, or would you go west-about, or what? Perhaps I can take the east- about route first. For ordinary, routine RAF trooping flights we are at the moment considering what routes we shall use in the future, after April 1976, when we will have withdrawn from Gan. There are a number of possibilities, one of which is that we would use Akrotiri as a staging post. It is not certain that we will do this as a matter of routine; it may turn out more convenient and more economical to use wholly civil airports on the east- about route. So far as I know, we have no plans for routine air trooping flights to Hong Kong on the west-about route.

Mr Sandelson

65. What is the strength numerically of our forces in Oman?- -I think I would have to let you have a note on that. Speaking from memory it is round

about *** * personnel providing direct

assistance, and about 200 on loan, but that is something we would have to check.

Mr Kershaw

66. Are the surveillance and recon- naissance facilities provided by Mount Olympus and that other place and the SBAs generally reproducable elsewhere? If you are to continue to stay in Cyprus then you do need local air de- fence facilities in the Island.

If you were no longer in Cyprus at some date. in the future then it might be possible to re-provide elsewhere those facilities now in Cyprus which form part of the * * * air defence ground environment and its associated communications systems. So long as we continue there, it is convenient to continue to provide those *** facilities using the installa- tions which we now have in Cyprus.

Mr Sandelson

67. Would NATO have any use for the Sovereign Base Areas regardless of our presence in Cyprus? Or would NATO have any use for them perhaps collectively in a compound operation, with the British forces and the Sovereign Bases in Cyprus in the future?--I think the answer to that is no. Sovereign Base Areas in Cyprus are not within the NATO direct ambit, and I do not think that we would expect NATO to take a direct interest in the SBAs.

The

68. What would you describe as being our main purpose now, and so far as you could judge, in the future, assuming the position resolves itself on the island? What role would you say we had to play in Cyprus? -If we make that large assumption that the political situation in Cyprus has cleared up, and that complete accord has been reached between the communities, and between Greece and Turkey, I think the primary factor in our consideration of whether we should continue to stay in the island or not would almost certainly be the broad strategic situation at the time in the Eastern Mediterranean and on the southern flank of NATO.