further afield would appear to be virtually nil for the foreseeable
future. Not surprisingly the Vietnamese have made several efforts
over the years to win over ASEAN or at the least to work on differences
of approach, however slight, which have appeared in the ASEAN ranks
so far with little success.
It therefore looks as though the Vietnamese will have their hands full
for many years ahead in attempting to solve their various problems.
The same is true of China, a power with which the countries of SE
Asia must always reckon, by virtue of her proximity. China has set
herself the goal of modernisation of her economy a task which is
likely to absorb her energies for a considerable time.
Beijing's call
for reunification with Taiwan in September 1981 indicated that the
Chinese leadership would much prefer a political rather than a
military solution to this problem. China has gone some way towards
loosening her links with the dissident communist parties of SE Asia
not far enough some might say but nevertheless the trend is
encouraging. She continues to give them moral support (partly as a
means of countering Vietnamese or Soviet influence) but appears to
have reduced her material assistance. The situation requires watching
but there would seem to be no cause for alarm.
Nor does it look as though the USSR has its sights on SE Asia in any
immediate sense. Its main concern at the moment appears to be to
shore up its proxy Vietnam, to build up a certain presence in Laos and
Cambodia, to maintain good relations with the member states of ASEAN and
to counter Chinese influence wherever it can. However, the Soviet
naval air base at Cam Ranh Bay with its strategic connotations for
links between the Soviet Far East and the Indian Ocean might be seen
as a foot in the door although, the Vietnamese would probably send
the Russians packing if ever they felt that the USSR was in danger of
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