TNAG-1142-FCO40-1422-Hong-Kong-and-the-Falkland-Islands-crisis-1982 — Page 97

Mr Thomson

Mr Elliott

CONFIDENTIAL

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CHINESE POSITION ON FALKLANDS: TAIWAN

1. In considering and commenting on the Falklands crisis, the Chinese are at present probably more concerned with Taiwan than Hong Kong implications. Taiwan, unlike Hong Kong, is already on the Chinese agenda of current business: its reunification with the mainland is asserted to be a task for the 1980's.

Because of prejudice against British imperialism and to keep in line with the Non-Aligned Movement's resolutions, China accepts Argentina's claim to sovereignty over the Falklands. To deny Argentina's right to use force to reclaim her sovereign territory would imply that China had no right to use force to reclaim Taiwan. China does not intend to use force to take back Taiwan and calls for all such 'problems left over from history' to be resolved peacefully. But she cannot renounce the ultimate right to use force if necessary. This is not just a theoretical question for lawyers and academics but an issue at the heart of the tortuous negotiations aimed at avoiding a down-grading of Sino-US relations, If China would bind herself not to use force against Taiwan her problems with the US could be easily settled, but she will not do so, seeing such a commitment as a derogation of her sovereignty and as effectively entrenching indefinitely the 'Two Chinas' status quo.

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For this reason, as well as to avoid losing Argentina's friendship or being at odds with mainstream Third World sentiment, China will not condemn the Argentine invasion of the Falklands. But this does not mean that the invasion was welcome to thoughtful Chinese diplomats and statesmen. China, as a poor, backward country with vast frontiers, has a general interest in the outlawing of force in international relations. But, of more immediate importance, the Argentine invasion and China's failure to condemn it may make it more difficult for the US Administration to make concessions to Peking whose apparent effect might be to expose Taiwan to a greater danger of invasion from the mainland. After seeing the fate of the 1800 Falkland Islanders, American public opinion may be even less willing to leave the 18 million people of Taiwan (responsibility for whose defence they assumed for 30 years) unprotected against Peking. And China's attitude to the Argentine invasion of the Falklands may cause people to wonder how sincere or reliable are her professions that Taiwan's reunification with the mainland will come by peaceful means. The Taiwan lobby in the US will not miss the opportunity to paint Communist China in sinister colours. (For the Taiwan people themselves it did not need Argentine action in the South Atlantic to warn them of the danger to their way of life posed by the mainland state.)

N J Cox

Far Eastern Department

CODE 18-77

SS 8/78

26 April 1982

cc:

Mr Coghlan

Mr Williamson, HKGD

Mr Barrie, NAD

Mr Walker, Research Dept

Mr. Sullivan, Cabinet Office

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