TNAG-1142-FCO40-1422-Hong-Kong-and-the-Falkland-Islands-crisis-1982 — Page 96

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Mr Mallaby Planning Staff

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FALKLANDS CRISIS: WIDER IMPLICATIONS

1.

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Mr Donald

Mr Goodison

FED

Falklands Emergency Unii

Thank you for your minute of 12 April in which you asked whether there are any implications for China's attitude to Hong Kong or for confidence within Hong Kong. As Mr Donald explained in his minute of 15 April to you the Falklands and Hong Kong cases are quite different.

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2. China's consistent attitude has been that Hong Kong is Chinese territory and that the situation is a legacy of history to be solved by peaceful negotiation. I do not think that this attitude will be influenced by what is happening in the Falklands. There has never been any indication that the Chinese would contemplate a military solution to Hong Kong. The 'People's Daily' contained a comment on 15 April that 'one can understand the national feelings of the Argentinian people in taking and protecting their sovereignty'. I think that the significance of this comment lies mainly in the context of Taiwan and Sino/US disagreements, but in the Hong Kong context it is also a reminder to us of Chinese sensitivity about questions of sovereignty. The continued prosperity of Hong Kong

is important to the Chinese and they will also recognise that the Hong Kong and Falklands cases are different. But they will be watching Falklands events closely. The Falklands dispute may make it even more difficult for Chinese opinion to stomach the kind of compromise of patriotic principle which will be necessary if we are to reach a satisfactory agreement on the future.

Moreover, their perception of how we handle the crisis could well affect their tactics in negotiations over Hong Kong. (This is apart from any immediate effect on the atmosphere of our relations with Peking which might stem from disagreement over the Falklands crisis per se).

3. There is no sign so far that the Falkland Islands crisis has had any effect on confidence in Hong Kong. A lack of commitment on our part over the Falkland Islands might affect confidence but this is conjecture. On the other hand, our commitment in the Falklands case may make Hong Kong people more hawkish in their demands on us, eg over the right of admission to the UK in case of an emergency. Like China, Hong Kong will also be watching Falklands events closely. There is a risk of our losing both ways. If we fail over the Falklands, confidence in Hong Kong might be affected; if we succeed, it could make difficulties for us by raising the expectations of the people in Hong Kong.

4.

It is important meanwhile that we make no statements which might circumscribe our room for negotiation with the Chinese over Hong Kong, eg statements in the context of the Dependent Territories in general about the right of inhabitants to self-determination. (We have submitted a set of answers to possible questions for use by Ministers if pressed).

26 April 1982

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R D Clift

Hong Kong and General Department CONFIDENTIAL