78
eter,
evidence."23 The Intelligence File was opened on the next day, enclosing Quinn's report and the statements Alan and Michael. In compiling the report and the file, Quinn called for the Yuen Long file, and this was the second time that he saw this file.
56. On 30 October 1979, Brooks and Clancy took the MacLennan and Logan files to see Moor. Having briefed by Brooks on the contents of these files, Moor considered that there was sufficiently strong evidence to justify the targetting of both MacLennan and Logan, and he directed Clancy that they should be targetted. Moor did not read the files himself and the meeting lasted about ten minutes. Moor then ordered that the Yuen Long file and MacLennan's personal files be brought to him. He read the files and realized that a prosecution of MacLennan could be a sensitive matter and that allegations of his victimization were a real possibility. He therefore requested frequent briefings from Clancy and asked that the investigation files relating to both MacLennan and Logan be brought to him when they were completed.
57. In his examination-in-chief, Moor said that he was not aware of the Yuen Long incident when he ordered the targetting of MacLennan. He later conceded, under cross-examination that he might have heard something, though not in detail, about the Yuen Long incident from Clancy before the "snippets" on MacLennan were relayed to him earlier in September 1979. Moor accepted the suggestion that it would not have made any sense if Clancy did not brief him on the Yuen Long background before passing on those “gossipy tid-bits" to him.
58.
Apart from the Yuen Long incident, Moor was also, at the time of targetting MacLennan, aware of Fulton's complaint that Brooks and Quinn had brought excessive pressure on him in relation to the MacLennan matter. He learnt this from Clancy on 10 October 1979.
59.
Moor said that he, with the Yuen Long background and Fulton's complaint in mind, was alert to the possibility that the SIU might be over-zealous in their pursuit of MacLennan. The following is an extract of Moor's evidence in reply to questions put by Leading Counsel for the Commission:-
24
"Mr. Beveridge: And you were aware that there were these special factors which should have made you alert to a possibility
that the SIU were being over-zealous in their pursuit of John MacLennan.
Mr. Moor:
All I was doing at that stage, Mr. Beveridge, was, in fact, targetting an Officer. I was not directing a prosecution. I was targetting, which was with a view to obtaining evidence. No more, no less.
Mr. Beveridge: I understand your distinction, Mr. Moor, but the targetting was itself a serious step, was it not?
Mr. Moor:
It was.
Mr. Beveridge: I'll put the question again: you were taking that step in relation to a Police Officer, you agreed, and you were doing it in a context when you appreciated you should be alert to the possibility of ŠIU over-zealousness, right?
Mr. Moor:
Yes.
Mr. Beveridge: And yet you did that without yourself even reading the statements upon which they were seeking leave to
target.
Mr. Moor:
At that point in time.
Mr. Beveridge:
Mr. Moor:
Do you think, Mr. Moor, that you yourself may have been influenced in some way by that stage by the knowledge of the Yuen Long incident?
I would hope not.
Mr. Beveridge: Well, I think at first in your evidence you said 'When I targetted John MacLennan I can honestly say I was not aware of the Yuen Long matter'. But, of course, we now know that that statement wasn't correct, don't we?
Mr. Moor:
In detail.
Mr. Beveridge: Looking back as best you may, Mr. Moor, I don't propose to pursue this at length, do you not think that John MacLennan's background may have accounted in part for the readiness with which you accepted that he should be targetted?
Mr. Moor:
No."
60. The Commissioner of Police, Mr. Henry, was also asked by Leading Counsel for the Commission to comment on Moor's decision to target MacLennan without reading the file and statements himself. Mr. Henry expressed the view that at a very senior level, such as the Deputy Commissioner, the Officer should become fully appraised of the facts by either reading the papers or by accurate briefing but there was no standard practice in this regard. When asked whether it would be safe for Moor to target MacLennan, knowing the special circumstances that there might be the danger of SIU being over-zealous, on a ten minute briefing, Mr. Henry made the following comments:-
23 See paragraph 1 of Quinn's covering report dated 25 October 1979 in the Intelligence File on MacLennan.
24 See Transcript pages 10912-10913.
25 See Transcript pages 11497-11498.
25
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