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CONFIDENTIAL
ANNEX A
PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES
25th-28th FEBRUARY 1981
UNITED KINGDOM OBJECTIVES
1.
To demonstrate to the new President the fundamental importance we attach to our relations with the United States, in NATO, in United States- European Community co-operation, and bilaterally, and the value we see in consulting on and co-ordinating policy, in all three contexts.
2.
To strengthen the President in his apparently favourable view of Britain in general, and of Mrs. Thatcher and her Government in particular.
3.
To reinforce the stated inclination of the new President and his Secretary of State to consult closely and frequently with their NATO ailies,
A.
To impress upon President Reagan the importance and value of European political co-operation and the fact that it pulls in the same general direction as United States interests.
5.
To discuss the need for co-ordinated policies in East-West relations, with particular reference to Afghanistan and South West Asia, the role of arms control and the future of detente.
6.
To exchange views on policy towards Poland, including the Western response to a Soviet military intervention and the handling of the rescheduling of Polish debt.
7. To establish our position as a partner whose views on defence and arms control command the attention of the new Administration, to explain the British Government's own defence effort and its approach to defence equipment collaboration with the United States, and to convince President Reagan of the importance of a defence policy which secures a positive and cohesive response from European allies,
8.
To elicit from the President some indication of the new Administration's views on the Middle East, to explain European objectives in the Middle East, and to persuade him of the need for the United States to take a freeh look at the Palestine question with a view to a co-ordinated allied approach to the problems of the area.
9. To obtain American undertakings (a) to oppose the extension of mandatory United Nations sanctions against South Africa, but (b) to continue to support the objective of internationally recognised independence for Namibia, based upon the United Nations plan.
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CONFIDENTIAL
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