The only significant argument the other way is political. A successful, long-term, joint venture between Hong Kong and China on a new airport could be a major step towards securing Hong Kong's future. But it is doubtful whether a mutually acceptable agreement could be negotiated. There would always be a strong possibility that lengthy negotiations would lead finally to proposals which were not totally satisfactory (e.g. on air traffic rights or management). The failure of negotiations on such a project would not just bë neutral; it would have a negative effect on confidence which could be serious. Furthermore, lengthy, but ultimately abortive, negotiations would delay decisions in Hong Kong on both the airport and the development of Lantau.
12.
It is therefore proposed:
(a) that, consistent with the decision
on memorandum XCC (80) 70 of 27th May 1980 (para. 1 above), the Government should continue to treat Chek Lap Kok as the only potentially viable site for Hong Kong's replacement international airport;
(b) that, if the need arises, the Government
should discourage speculation that Shum Chun or any other site in China might be considered as an alternative to Chek Lap Kok;
(c)
(a)
that the Government should make it clear to the Chinese authorities in response to any further tentative enquiries of the sort mentioned in paragraphs 2 and 3 above that:
(i)
it is proceeding with the further studies, investigations and planning in respect of the Chek Lap Kok site in the interest of making adequate preparations to provide the air transport facilities needed to
maintain Hong Kong's prosperity; and
(ii) the site is a good one;
and
that the Government should only reconsider this question if the political advantage of
an offer. made by the Chinese outweighed all the practical disadvantages.
CONFIDENTIAL
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.