Kai Tak would make it difficult for either airport to be operated at a profit, at least for a considerable period.
Ground access.
The distance even from a site just across the border would be greater by road than the distance from Chek Lap Kok to central Hong Kong. The logistical disadvantages of transporting by road 25 million passengers and 1,2 million tonnes of cargo a year by 1995 are obvious. There would also be the problem of coping with a total of some 50,000 staff movements to and from the airport every 24 hours by 1995. The provision of adequate communica- tions to an airport in China would not only be financially, but also socially expensive in terms of the displacement of people to enable access roads to be built. The potential for sea access to an airport in China is not as good as at Chek Lap Kok.
(e) Limitations on use. Any pressure by the
Chinese affecting the operation of the airport, movement of passengers, airport personnel and cargo, could have a significant impact on Hong Kong's economy. Even when relations were untroubled and there was no risk of pressure, there could be problems about the use of the airport by certain airlines (e.g. China Airlines, South African Airways and Korean Airlines). Furthermore, regardless of what agreement was reached with China, there could be no guarantee that future Chinese Governments would apply it as impartially or favourably towards Hong Kong as the one which signed it.
(I)
(S) SARĪT, LDA
Implications for the development of Lantau. Chek Lap Kok airport will not be an easy or a cheap airport to build, but the programme for its construction is compatible with the proposed programme for the development of North Lantau. While North Lantau is an obvious area for industrial development, its development will be expensive because of the need to connect it to the mainland. The siting of the replacement airport at Chek Lap Kok helps to justify the development of the area as a whole.
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