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(V) PARA 1E. I AGREE.
(VI) PARA 1F. I AGREE THAT THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT PROVIDES THE
BEST OPPORTUNITY WE ARE LIKELY TO GET, SHORT OF A SLIDE IN CONFIDENCE, FOR RAISING THE QUESTION WITH THE CHINESE AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL. I ALSO AGREE THAT THE VISIT WILL AROUSE WIDESPREAD EXPECTATIONS THAT A DEAL OF SOME KIND IS TO BE
DONE. BUT I AM DOUBTFUL WHETHER IT WOULD BE WISE TO SUGGEST THAT THE ISSUE WOULD BE A KEY ELEMENT IN THE VISIT SO FAR IN ADVANCE AND IN CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH CANNOT NOW BE FORESEEN. I SHOULD THEREFORE PREFER RATHER MORE CAUTIOUS WORDING FOR THE SECOND AND THIRD SENTENCES OF PARAGRAPH 5, PERHAPS ON THE LINES OF: QUOTE THE LORD PRIVY SEAL'S VISIT IN JANUARY 1982 WILL PROVIDE AN EARLY OPPORTUNITY TO DO THIS. AT A LATER STAGE OUR AMBASSADOR IN PEKING WILL BE ABLE TO GIVE
NOTICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S INTENTION TO RAISE THE PROBLEM WHEN HE DISCUSSES THE AGENDA FOR HER VISIT TO
CHINA WITH THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNQUOTE.
2. THOUGH IT IS FOR YOU TO JUDGE, MINISTERS SEEM LIKELY TO FOCUS ON THE PROPOSAL FOR RENUNCIATION OF SOVEREIGNTY AND TO ASK WHAT THE PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES WOULD BE. I UNDERSTAND THAT THE FCO LEGAL ADVISERS TAKE THE VIEW THAT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO CONCEDE SOVEREIGNTY WITHOUT UNDERMINING EITHER HONG KONG'S SEPARATE EXISTENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW OR THE GOVERNOR'S DOMESTIC JURISDICTION. IF THIS IS CORRECT, THE PAPER MIGHT USEFULLY SAY SO, PERHAPS IN A SHORT SEPARATE
PARAGRAPH AFTER EXISTING PARAGRAPH 3.
MACLEHOSE
LIMITED нкаят FIED MRDONALD
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