TNAG-1040-FCO40-1290-Future-of-Hong-Kong-1981 — Page 90

DSR 11C

4.

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Before the Prime Minister's visit we will-need to give

the Chinese advance notice of our concerns without putting

forward any specific proposals that they might feel obliged

to reject in advance. The Lord Privy Seal's visit in

January 1982 would provide an opportunity to probe the

Chinese on their latest thinking. Also, when our Ambassador

in Peking discusses the agenda for the Prime Minister's visit

with the Chinese Government, he will be able to emphasise

the Prime Minister's interest in the problem.

5.

Meanwhile, contacts will certainly continue between the

Chinese Government and leading personalities from Hong Kong,

particularly in the commercial field. These can be useful in

explaining the problem to the Chinese but it would be wrong

to employ them directly as intermediaries in seeking a

solution.

6. If there were a slide in confidence we would need to move

quickly with high level messages in London and Peking to get

talks going.

7.

Ministers are asked to approve the contingency paper as

a guide to discussion with the Chinese. Since the latter would

be played by ear there is no point in singling out a preferred

option. The Prime Minister's visit may clarify Chinese views

to some extent but the problem is likely to drag on for

several years. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary will

ensure that the paper is revised as required and will raise

the problem with his OD colleagues again as necessary.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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DSR 11 (Revised)

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