TNAG-1040-FCO40-1290-Future-of-Hong-Kong-1981 — Page 89

DSR 11C

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only one example, large numbers of Hong Kong residents could

seek entry to the United Kingdom.)

2.

The paper outlines options for discussion with the

Chinese to check a slide in confidence in Hong Kong. Given

the Chinese attitude, we are unlikely to obtain any

definitive solution but we might hope for more specific

reassurances. The most realistic might be an agreement that

there should be long-term notice of any change in the status of

the Territory or statements by both sides that Hong Kong is

Chinese territory temporarily under British administration

with no intention by the Chinese to change this for many

years to come. The latter would involve technical

renunciation of British sovereignty and the Chinese might

well seek a similar quid pro quo for the former. The legal

implications (eg responsibility for external affairs,

citizenship, etc) are being examined.

3. The Prime Minister has agreed in principle to visit

China. This might take place in September 1982. It would be

impossible to avoid mentioning the Hong Kong problem and

at more

the visit would raise expectations that a solution would be

found. There is a risk that we would in fact obtain no more

than a repetition of earlier Chinese general assurances.

This would create disillusionment and could affect

confidence in the Territory. We must therefore aim

precise assurances. Whether these could be as firm as the

two options mentioned above is doubtful but given the

importance of the occasion it might be possible to produce

a general statement on the importance of maintaining the

and the need for long-range warning of any change.

/4.

status quo

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