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DSR 110
(ii) Problems for HMG.
Only a temporary palliative
F)
unless coupled with power of continuing administration.
(iii) Effect. If done now, a short-term beneficial effect.
But lacks long-term credibility unless coupled with
arrangements for administration after 1997. Not
sufficient to halt slide of confidence.
Unilateral action by HMG to remove the limit in the 1898
Order in Council on powers of administration in the New
Territories; Chinese acquiescence
(i) Likelihood. Part of the rejected 1979 proposals.
Chinese acquiescence would need to be obvious. They
are not likely to accept unless coupled with concessions
on sovereignty. Would therefore lead to solution similar
to (C).
(ii)
Problems for HMG. As in (C) (ii) above.
(iii) Effect.
Conclusion
11.
As in (C) (iii) above.
Stronger verbal assurances from the Chinese (option A)
would not by themselves have a significant effect on confidence
in Hong Kong; and neither would a statement that 1997 had
no relevance (B), unless it opened the way to action by HMG
on the continuation of administrative powers. Measures to
solve the land lease problem with Chinese consent (E), would
be only of short-term effect. Option (D), providing a period
of warning before any change were made in the status of
Hong Kong, is marginally the most attractive from the UK point
of view. A public agreement that the treaties on Hong Kong were not applicable but that British administration could continue for the present (C) would also be satisfactory. third possibility is (F) - removal, with Chinese agreement,
A
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