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SECRET
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DSR 11C
F)
(ii) Problems for HMG.
temporary
Only a temporary palliative
unless coupled with power of continuing administration.
(iii) Effect. If done now, a short-term beneficial effect.
But lacks long-term credibility unless coupled with
arrangements for administration after 1997. Not
sufficient to halt slide of confidence.
Unilateral action by HMG to remove the limit in the 1898
Order in Council on powers of administration in the New
Territories; Chinese acquiescence
(i) Likelihood. Part of the rejected 1979 proposals.
Chinese acquiescence would need to be obvious. They
are not likely to accept unless coupled with concessions
on sovereignty. Would therefore lead to solution similar
to (C).
(ii) Problems for HMG. As in (C) (ii) above.
(iii) Effect.
Conclusion
9.
As in (C) (iii) above.
Stronger verbal assurances from the Chinese (option
A)
or a statement from them that 1997 had no relevance (B) would
not by themselves have a significant effect on confidence in
Hong Kong. Measures to solve the land lease problem with
Chinese consent (E), would be only of short-term effect.
Option (D), providing a period of warning before any change
were made in the status of Hong Kong, is marginally the most
attractive from the UK point of view. A public agreement
that the treaties on Hong Kong were not applicable but that
British administration could continue for the present (C)
would also be satisfactory. A third possibility is F
removal, with Chinese agreement, of the limit in the 1898
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/Order
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