SECRET
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would take no surprise action over Hong Kong.
DSR 11C
Might
be possible to build on this. Private hints on length
of warning easier for the Chinese than public statements.
(ii) Problems for HMG. Almost certainly would be
combined with Chinese demand that HMG concede Chinese
sovereignty. Still, better than (C), as it guarantees
length of tenure. Powers of continuing administration
could be tied to Chinese declaration. So could land
leases. Both require Chinese assurances about the
period of warning to be made public in some firms.
for continued British administration would have to be
Chief drawback lies in the fact
negotiated with Chinese.
that the assurance is only effective so long as the
Chinese do not institute a period of warning.
Basis
As soon
as that happened we would face weakening confidence in
Hong Kong, although certainly firms and others would have time to make their plans.
(iii)
Effect. Major boost to confidence.
Sufficient
to halt slide of confidence. But only provided it was quickly followed by UK legislation to bring B ritish
jurisdiction and powers of administration into line with
new concept of validity of 15 years constantly rolled forward until notice given by CPG. The legal mechanics
would need to be worked out.
E) Unilateral action by HMG to take powers to issue land
leases beyond 1997; assurance of tacit Chinese approval
(i) Likelihood. Possible, particularly if done in the
form of automatically renewable periodic leases and with
no mention of 1997. Chinese might see it as a necessary way of preserving investor confidence. Has advantage of
requiring little action on their part.
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.